The Foreboding Decline of the Judiciary in Hungary and Turkey

Author: Luke Bache

Field of Study: Social Sciences

Program Affiliation: Source Project Research Program

Faculty Mentors: Matthew Cole

Easel: 20

Timeslot: Morning

Abstract: Across the globe, autocratic governments are surging, characterized by gradual democratic decline and the overhaul of democratic institutions. To understand this “new” authoritarianism on a deeper level, this paper examines the variations of institutional backsliding, specifically in the judicial branches of democratic governments. Through researching common trends in the undermining of the judiciary branch, this paper strives to determine how the varying nature of “judicial decay” can result in a substantial difference between evolving autocracies. With the ultimate goal of examining whether the pace and method of judicial decay influences the success of the authoritarian government that emerges, this paper compares Hungary’s immediate and effective “legal” judicial democratic backsliding with Turkey’s slower and more erratic judicial decay, especially after the 2017 coup attempt. The research in this paper establishes that the swift sidelining of the judiciary is more effective for a rising autocratic regime than slower dismantling.