International Climate Compliance

Author: Oliver Benenson

Field of Study: Philosophy, Politics and Law

Program Affiliation: Source Project Research Program

Faculty Mentors: Wendy Martinek

Easel: 67

Timeslot: Afternoon

Abstract: This paper examines why states vary in their compliance with international climate agreements such as the Paris Agreement. It argues that economic capacity and political regime type are key factors shaping whether countries translate international commitments into effective domestic action. Compliance is conceptualized as observable emissions outcomes and measured using the Environmental Performance Index (EPI) Climate Mitigation score, which enables systematic cross-national comparison. Economic capacity, operationalized as GDP per capita, captures states’ financial and institutional ability to implement costly climate policies, while democratic governance is expected to increase both accountability and enforcement. Drawing on theories of collective action and international cooperation, the study proposes that wealthier and more democratic countries are more likely to meet climate commitments. By identifying structural determinants of compliance, this research contributes to understanding global climate governance and offers insights for designing more effective and equitable international agreements.