The Politics of the Sixth Amendment: Explaining Structural Variation in State Public Defender Systems

Author: John Lazos

Field of Study: Political Science

Program Affiliation: Source Project Research Program

Faculty Mentors: Wendy Martinek

Easel: 94

Timeslot: Midday

Abstract: The study seeks to answer why public defender systems are structured differently across the fifty states in their organization, funding, and administration. While scholars have established that this variation exists and can affect the quality of representation for indigent defendants, the political and institutional factors driving these differences remain underexplored. This research argues that unified partisan control and state fiscal capacity can shape how a state structures its indigent defense system. To test this, the study uses state government trifectas and per-capita tax revenue. The study then tests both variables against a three-dimensional categorical framework that captures oversight, funding, and administration methods. The data collected is expected to shed light on the extent to which politics and economics shape indigent defense design. It can also help reveal why some people may receive unequal access to constitutionally guaranteed representation based on where they live.