Ideology or Strategy? Understanding Supreme Court Justice Voting Behavior in Civil Rights Cases

Author: Olivia Vitullo

Field of Study: Economics

Program Affiliation: Source Project Research Program

Faculty Mentors: Wendy Martinek

Easel: 75

Timeslot: Midday

Abstract: What accounts for the voting behavior of Supreme Court justices in civil rights cases? Existing scholarship posits that the attitudinal model—justices’ ideological preferences—and the strategic model—institutional constraint considerations—are two primary models of judicial voting behavior. This study theorizes that justices’ lifetime tenure enables ideological voting, whereas their lack of implementation power incentivizes strategic voting. Using justices’ ideology scores and presidential preference signals from State of the Union Addresses, the analysis tests whether ideology influences vote direction and whether presidential attention shapes judicial responsiveness. The findings indicate that liberal justices are most likely to vote liberally in civil rights cases, whereas conservative justices are least likely to do so, supporting the attitudinal model. However, the relationship between attention level and vote direction is not as straightforward. Thus, future research should seek to understand this complex relationship, and these findings raise important questions about the impartiality of Supreme Court justices’ decision making.